35 Why the Dutch Surrendered (1665)

There is not the least foundation for what he [the Director General, Peter Stuyvesant] sets forth both generally and particularly in his Defense, viz.: that he had not timely notice of the designs which the English and especially the aforesaid frigates might have had against New Netherland. And that the Company had on the contrary, as he gives out, informed him from this place that the English had no intention to use violence against New Netherland. Under all circumstances, the aforesaid Director had so magnified in diverse letters the actions of the New Englanders, their power and progress, and wrote especially that he entertained apprehensions for New Amsterdam so that in his letter of the 10th November 1663, he was evidently fearful of the loss of everything that people possessed. It behooved him therefore, even had he expected no new force from Old England, to have kept the place supplied with all necessaries, saying in his letter of the last of February 1664 that the English on Long Island were aiming at the whole country. Which was not strange, since the President of the rebellious troop had notified him to that effect, particularly stating that the Duke of York was sending some frigates to reduce New Netherland, as appears by the voucher. And lastly the aforesaid Director was, in all the Company’s dispatches, expressly charged and commanded to be on his guard, so that as already stated, he cannot plead that he had not received any warning.

Secondly, herewith falls the excuse he makes, that the farmers were constrained by the English not to convey any grain into the fort and that the said English had everywhere cut off the communication, so that grain could not be conveyed across the river. For having been warned in time, they ought not to have waited the arrival of the frigates but [to] have employed the interval between the 4th of August, when the aforesaid letter was written to the Company, and the arrival of the frigates to provide themselves with grain and not delayed, as he has done, until the enemy was at the door.

Finally, the aforesaid Stuyvesant says that the scarcity of provisions was caused among other things by the arrival of the ship Gideon with between three and four hundred Negroes. Truly also, a flimsy excuse. For besides the number not being so large, one-fourth of them had been delivered to the officer of the city’s Colony on the South river, who took his departure with them for the South river three days after the arrival of the frigates because he saw the shape things were taking in New Netherland and around the government. And the remainder were sold shortly after, so that he had not to provide for them.

Want of ammunition being represented as the second fundamental cause of the surrender of the aforesaid fort, city, and Province of New Netherland, the above-named Company will also in good faith plead ignorance of that want. Yea will, on the contrary, assert that it is informed for certain that if there had not been a sufficient supply in store, a very considerable quantity of gunpowder would be found among the Burghers and particularly at Fort Orange and the Colony Rensselaerswyck among the traders.

The third point of his defense — the unwillingness of the Burghers to defend the city — since all the world sufficiently knows what zeal they had exhibited to protect their property. Working with all their might at the defense of the place until the want of provisions and ammunition was instilled into their minds by the government and the enemy’s strength represented to be much greater than it was in fact. The unwillingness of the Burghers to fight cannot be any excuse for him, inasmuch as it was his duty to defend the fort. Such being his apprehension also, he endeavors to defend himself by saying that the fort was declared untenable and even were it maintained, that the whole Province could not be preserved thereby. The defense of the fort only must be looked to, even though all the houses had to be pulled down. For the fort once lost, the State and Company lost everything. But ‘tis here again to be regretted that the Company was served by men who preferred to save their own property, which they had gained in the Company’s employ, than to observe their oath and honor.

The fourth point was that they had no hope of relief. This is spread out so broad as if, for this reason alone, the place ought not to be defended. On this point the Company will merely persist in what is stated in its observations and accordingly submit that it could not know what the aforesaid Director also might say if no relief should arrive. In all cases, he was not at liberty to surrender such a place without striking a blow, especially so long as it was not really attacked. For as regards relief, they did not know what help would arrive from [the] Fatherland, because the Company’s last letters had assured them of immediate assistance or a settlement of the boundary. Consequently, the one or the other being to happen, he ought not to have adopted so rash a resolution. Besides, the Company has as much cause for positively asserting that the English, on seeing the Director putting himself in a posture of defense and having the courage to repel them, would not have attacked the place as the Director for saying that no relief was at hand. And for the preceding reasons, the Company will pass over the long detail which the Director makes in his aforesaid writing of other events in the foregoing years as both irrelevant and immaterial, and once more conclude on this point: that he ought to have waited until he saw the enemy commence the attack before he resolved on the surrender of the place for want of assistance.

In truth, whether this becomes a Director-General or not, the Company need not add any more. It only says that ’tis an action that never can be palliated in a Director-General, to stand between the gabions [walls] looking at two hostile frigates passing the fort and the mouths of 20 pieces of cannon, several of them demi-cannons, and not give an order to prevent them. But on the contrary, lend an ear to Clergymen and other craven-hearted people. Pretending that he was wishing to order fire, yet will allow himself to be led in from the rampart between the Clergymen. And then for the first time, give himself any trouble after the frigates have passed, when for the first time, he will march forth to prevent a landing. The excuse he gives, that it was resolved not to commence the first act of hostility, is a very poor one. For the English had committed all acts of hostility, carrying off the city’s cattle and the boat in which the slaves were, taking one of the soldiers who was with them prisoner after he had been wounded, capturing Claes Verbraeck’s sloop. Afterwards taking Isaac de Foreest prisoner, forbidding the farmers furnishing supplies, firing shot at the St. Jacob’s boat, and lastly summoning the city and fort in order to save the shedding of blood. And committing many other acts, too many to be here related. So that there was no difficulty to answer them in the same manner.

The Company now believing that it has fulfilled your Honorable Mightinesses’ intention, will only again say in conclusion that the sole cause and reason for the loss of the aforesaid place were these: the Authorities and the chief officer being very deeply interested in lands, bouweries [farms], and buildings were unwilling to offer any opposition, in order thereby not to afford any pretext for firing and destroying their properties. And having always paid more attention to their particular affairs than to the Company’s interests. New Amsterdam was found, on the arrival of the English frigates, as if an enemy was never to be expected. And finally that the Director, first following the example of heedless interested parties, gave himself no other concern than about the prosperity of his bouweries and, when the pinch came, allowed himself to be rode over by Clergymen, women and cowards in order to surrender to the English what he could defend with reputation, for the sake of thus saving their private properties. And the Company will further leave to your Honorable Mightinesses’ good and prudent wisdom, what more ought to be done in this case.

Source: Reply of the West India Company to the Answer of the Honorable Peter Stuyvesant (1666), in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New-York (edited by E. B. O’Callaghan, Albany, 1858), II, 491-503. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.45493/page/n557/mode/2up