121 Argument for the Embargo (1808)
Mr. President, I have always understood that there were two objects contemplated by the embargo laws. The first precautionary, operating upon ourselves. The second coercive, operating upon the aggressing belligerents. Precautionary in saving our seamen, our ships, and our merchandize from the plunder of our enemies and avoiding the calamities of war. Coercive by addressing strong appeals to the interests of both the belligerents. The first object has been answered beyond my most sanguine expectations. To make a fair and just estimate of this measure, reference should be had to our situation at the time of its adoption. At that time the aggressions of both the belligerents were such as to leave the United States but a painful alternative in the choice of one of three measures. To wit, the embargo, war, or submission.
It was found that merchandize to the value of one hundred millions of dollars was actually afloat in vessels amounting in value to twenty millions more. That an amount of merchandize and vessels equal to fifty millions more was expected to be shortly put afloat and that it would require fifty thousand seamen to be employed in the navigation of that enormous amount of property. The administration was informed of the hostile edicts of France previously issued and then in a state of execution and of an intention on the part of Great Britain to issue her orders, the character and object of which were also known. The object was to sweep this valuable commerce from the ocean. The situation of this commerce was as well known to Great Britain as to ourselves and her inordinate cupidity could not withstand the temptation of the rich booty she vainly thought within her power. This was the state of information at the time this measure was recommended.
The President of the United States ever watchful and anxious for the preservation of the persons and property of all our fellow citizens but particularly of the merchants whose property is most exposed to danger and of the seamen whose persons are also most exposed, recommended the embargo for the protection of both. And it has saved and protected both. It is admitted by all that the embargo laws have saved this enormous amount of property and this number of seamen which without them would have forcibly gone into the hands of our enemies to pamper their arrogance, stimulate their injustice, and increase their means of annoyance.
I should suppose, Mr. President, this saving worth some notice. But Sir we are told that instead of protecting our seamen, it has driven them out of the country and into foreign service. I believe Sir, that this fact is greatly exaggerated. But Sir, suppose for a moment that it is so, the government has done all in this respect it was bound to do. It placed these seamen in the bosoms of their friends and families, in a state of perfect security. And if they have since thought proper to abandon these blessings and emigrate from their country, it was an act of choice not of necessity.
But Sir, these are not the only good effects of the embargo. It has preserved our peace, it has saved our honor, it has saved our national independence. Are these savings not worth notice? Are these blessings not worth preserving?
The gentleman next triumphantly tells us that the embargo laws have not had their expected effects upon the aggressing belligerents. That they have not had their complete effects, that they have not caused a revocation of the British orders and French decrees, will readily be admitted. But they certainly have not been without beneficial effects upon those nations. The first effect of the embargo upon the aggressing belligerents was to lessen their inducements to war by keeping out of their way the rich spoils of our commerce which had invited their cupidity and which was saved by those laws. The second effect which the embargo laws have had on the aggressing belligerents is to enhance prices of all American produce, especially articles of the first necessity to them, to a considerable degree. And if it be a little longer persisted in, will either banish our produce (which I believe indispensable to them) from their markets altogether or increase the prices to an enormous amount. And of course we may hope will furnish irresistible inducements for a relaxation of their hostile orders and edicts.
All these considerations must present strong inducements to Great Britain to revoke her hostile orders, but she has hitherto refused to do so. Let a candid inquiry be now made into the actual causes of this refusal. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd) informs us that the British cabinet showed some solicitude about the embargo laws till sometime between the 22d of June and the 29th of July last, within which time information flowed in upon them which relieved them from this solicitude.
What was the information that flowed in upon the British cabinet from the 22d June to the 29th July? That period announced two events. First the wonderful revolution in Spain; although this event must have been pretty well understood in London before even the 22d June, perhaps not to its full extent. The other event was the paltry attempt at the resistance of the embargo laws in Vermont magnified into a formidable insurrection against the government. And the unhappy discontents manifested in Boston and its neighborhood together with the results of the elections in Massachusetts. All these circumstances were certainly greatly exaggerated or perhaps utterly misrepresented. Here then Sir we clearly discern the real causes of the refusal of the British cabinet to meet the just and honorable proposition of the United States and to revoke their orders in council. The Spanish revolution no doubt contributed to their determination but the principal cause was our own divisions and discontents, either wholly misrepresented or highly exaggerated.
It is asked Sir, how do the embargo laws operate on France? It is readily admitted that the commercial connection between the United States and France is not of such a nature as to make a suspension of it operate as injuriously to France herself, particularly in the interior, as on Great Britain. But our commerce cannot be deemed unimportant to France in the feeble state of her navy. The French West India islands too have felt the pressure with great severity. I think Sir, I am warranted in concluding that if the embargo laws have failed of complete success, their failure has been owing to extraordinary causes which could neither have been foreseen nor anticipated at the time of the adoption of the measure and therefore cannot furnish any imputation against its policy or wisdom.
I have said Sir, that there are no substitutes for the embargo but war or submission. I will now proceed to prove this position. A repeal of the embargo without a substitute is submission, if with a substitute it is war. Gentlemen in the opposition seem fully sensible of the delicacy and urgency of this part of the question. When pressed for their substitute, they manifest vast reluctance in producing it. The gentleman from Connecticut intimates merely that he is in favor of an armed commerce. Would he extend it to acts of reprisal? If so, it is immediate war. Would he stop short of that? It would still be war, but of a more inefficient kind. If our vessels are to arm, I presume their arms are to be used in self defense. They would be used against both the belligerents. In the present temper of Great Britain, the first gun fired in a spirit of hostility, even with a blank cartridge or if it were a pop-gun, would be instant war. It would be the signal to her navy to seize upon the whole of our commerce which would be spread over the ocean, the moment of raising the embargo. The gentleman’s substitute I therefore believe to be war, and war of the most inefficient kind. A repeal of the embargo without a substitute is submission. Submission to what? To colonization, to taxation, to tribute!!
Source: William B. Giles, Speech on the Resolution of Mr. Hillhouse, to Repeal the Embargo Laws, November 24, 1808, 4-15. https://archive.org/details/toldcontemporari03hartrich/page/402/mode/2up
