Chapter Outline

Section 1: Brief History

Section 2: Ethnic, Religious, and Cultural Identity

Section 3: Political Culture and Civil Society

Section 4: Political Participation

Section 5: Formal Political Institutions

Section 6: Political Economy

Section 7: Foreign Relations

 

Section 1 – Historical Background

The lands and people that constitute modern Germany have a long and varied history. The term “Germania” is first recorded in the 1^st century BCE as the name of a province of the Roman Empire, which constituted several areas in Northern and Central Europe. However, the Roman use of that term is generally thought to extend to all peoples and lands of that region, not just those who spoke Germanic languages. Even if we just talk about the peoples who spoke Germanic languages, there were, at one point, almost 1800 different political entities (mostly Duchies) that exercised some form of independence and governing authority. This background essay can’t begin to capture all of that nuance. However, we will talk generally of the three historical Empires (“Reichs”) in German history up to 1945, before shifting to the modern-day democratic state that we see today.

1.1 – The Holy Roman Empire

Charlemagne, the King of the Franks (a Germanic-speaking group), was crowned Emperor of the Western Empire by Pope Leo III in 800 CE. Although the term “Holy Roman Empire” was not generally used until the 13^th century, Charlemagne’s crowning, and the unification of the Germanic princes and kingdoms under him, is generally thought of as the first step in the rise of that political entity. The Frankish kingdom went through several divisions and dynastic changes over the next century and a half. Eventually, Otto the Great (Otto the First) was crowned King of the Eastern Franks in 936, and recognized as Emperor (by Pope John XII) in 962. However, the role of Emperor, as used in this context, was not a powerful King (in the same sense that the Kings of England, France, and Spain would emerge in the Late Middle Ages). Rather, the Emperor’s purpose was more to mitigate disputes among the various Kingdoms, Principalities, and independent city-states within the realm, as well as to conduct foreign affairs with the Pope and the non-Germanic Kingdoms of Europe. After Otto’s death, his successors were largely elected by the other Germanic Kings and Princes; the general rule would then be for the Pope to recognize that “King of Germany” with the title of Holy Roman Emperor as well. For much of its history, the Empire was less of a unified political entity, and more of a loose confederation. In fact, this political disunity is generally considered to be the reason why the Empire eventually fell. With the rise of unified nation-states, especially powerful military entities such as England, Spain, and France, the Germanic Empire became a frequent victim of the expansionist urges of those other powers. The Napoleonic Wars of the early 19^th century eventually spelled the end of the Empire. Francis II, the last Emperor, saw his armies defeated in 1805. As a result, many of the small principalities, especially in what is now western Germany, left the Empire and joined the Confederation of the Rhine, which the French leader Napoleon created as an alternative German state. Francis himself abdicated the throne in 1806, bringing the thousand-year history of the Empire to a close.

 

1.2 – The Second Reich

Although Napoleon had defeated the Holy Roman Empire (as well as Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands), he over-extended his own military by warring with Russia, Prussia, and Britain, and eventually surrendered. In 1814-1815, the Allies who had defeated France met at Vienna, and redrew the map of Europe. Recognizing the weakness of the Imperial model, but also concerned that a unified Germany could threaten its neighbors, the Congress of Vienna settled on a new type of structure: the German Confederation. The roughly 300 Duchies, Margraves, and Principalities (including many that were ruled directly by a local Bishop or Abbot) that had existed prior to 1806 were consolidated into about forty such entities. The two largest and most powerful of these were the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. However, each of the individual Princes and Dukes (of the forty or so that remained) maintained authority within his own lands. Disputes between the rulers, and any issues of foreign affairs, would be decided by a Federal Convention, which consisted of the ruler of each member state. The Austrian Emperor (or his representative) chaired the Convention meetings, but all decisions would have to be unanimous. Each member state would then be bound by those agreements.

However, this arrangement only lasted for about a half century. As Prussia (which was industrializing much more quickly than most of its neighbors) grew in economic and military power, and both it and Austria found themselves in disputes with many of the smaller kingdoms (and each other), the Confederation eventually divided into factions. The Seven Weeks War (in 1866) was a quick and decisive victory for Prussia over Austria, and most of the northern Principalities and Duchies joined the new North German Confederation under Prussian leadership. By 1871, every remaining state except for Austria and Liechtenstein had joined the new Confederation, which renamed itself as the “German Empire” in that year. The King (Kaiser) of Prussia, Wilhelm I, became the Emperor of Germany, and his Chief Minister, Otto von Bismarck, became the Chancelor (roughly equivalent to the Prime Minister in Great Britain at the time) of this new Empire (which became known in popular parlance as the “Second Reich”, as a replacement for Charlemagne and Otto’s original “First Reich”).

Although each constituent state within the Empire still kept its Prince or Duke as a formal Head of State (only Prussia and Bavaria had “Kings”), the organization of this new entity (which was largely the handiwork of Bismarck) gave most of the real political authority to Prussia. Legislative powers were shared by an elected Reichstag and an appointed Bundesrat (the members of this upper house were appointed by each State). However, the Chancellor served solely at the pleasure of the Kaiser of Prussia (in his capacity as Emperor), and no law could be passed without consent of the Bundesrat. Because Prussia had the most powerful Army within the Emperor, this gave the Kaiser (and Bismarck) great influence over both the foreign affairs of the entire Empire, as well as internal debates in the Bundesrat. Under Bismarck and Wilhelm I, the Junkers (land-owning aristocrats from eastern Prussia) dominated the government of the late 19^th century. Laws suppressing the independence of the Catholic Church (which had become increasingly hostile towards the Protestant Prussian monarchy), labor unions, and even the activities of Socialist parties, were passed.

However, with the death of Wilhelm I in 1888, the short rule of his son Frederick (for less than four months), and the rise of Wilhelm’s grandson (Wilhelm II) as Emperor, Bismarck found himself increasingly isolated. Unlike his father and grandfather, Wilhelm II intended to be more hands-on in ruling the Empire, and resented Bismarck’s dominance. The Chancellor resigned in 1890, leaving Wilhelm II in charge.

Wilhelm then steered Germany towards a policy of military aggression (including a naval buildup that Britain perceived to be threatening to her interests, as well as vetoing a key defense treaty with Russia). At the same time, various social and economic pressures were being put on the government: the Socialist, Centre [Catholic Agrarian], and various Liberal parties all won significant numbers of seats in Reichstag elections in the period, but Wilhelm and his Ministers refused to negotiate with them. In 1914, after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand (the successor to the throne of Austria-Hungary) by a Serbian nationalist, Wilhelm pledged his military support to Austria (Germany’s sole remaining major ally in Europe). With Russia, France, Britain, and Italy (and eventually the United States, after 1917) on the other side, Germany and Austria fought a long, costly, and (eventually) losing battle against the Allies. The “Great War” (what we today call World War One) ended in November 1918 with the collapse of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as the abdication of Wilhelm II (Emperor Charles I of Austria didn’t technically abdicate, but renounced any intent to participate further in the governing of his Empire – his title was abolished by the Austrian government in 1919). King Ludwig III of Bavaria (the other major constituent monarchy within the Empire) fled to Hungary.

1.3 – The Weimar Republic and the Third Reich

In the wake of Wilhelm’s abdication, the fall of the Empire, and the devastation of military defeat, Germany faced a great political, economic, and social crisis. Sailors in Kiel rebelled against their officers, close to a million factory workers went on strike, and labor councils in Bavaria declared a “Socialist Republic” as an alternative to the Catholic monarchy that had ruled that part of southern Germany. A short-lived Provisional Government managed the demobilization of the Army, and accepted the Allied-imposed peace terms of the Treaty of Versailles. In response to the demands for a more representative political system, a group of party leaders within that Provisional Government (mostly Socialists, with a few Communists and Liberals) met at Weimar (a music and artistic center in Thuringia), and drafted a new Constitution (hence the name “Weimar Republic”). Instead of an Emperor, this system would feature a President (elected by the citizens for a seven-year term) with broad powers. The Reichstag (sometimes referred to as the National Assembly in this period) would remain in place, with elections taking place in multi-member districts, and seats allocated by proportion. The Chancellor was to be appointed by the President, but Presidents were expected to only appoint those who could command a majority of the Reichstag.

Historians of the Weimar Republic tend to focus on its weaknesses. The proportional system of election tended to reward small, ideologically focused parties, which made compromise and broad consensus difficult to achieve. In the early years of the Republic, four centrist parties (Social Democratic and Democratic Liberal on the center-left, and Catholic Centre and Peoples Party on the center-right) tended to dominate the Chancellorship and Cabinet positions. However, the economic crises of the late 1920s and early 1930s saw the rising influence of the far Left (particularly the Communists) and extreme Nationalist groups (such as the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, or Nazi, in its shortened form). The refusal of these ideologically extreme parties to compromise with the larger centrist parties is often cited as one factor in the collapse of the Weimar Republic.

Another weakness was the formal relationship between the President, the Chancellor, and the Reichstag. In most modern Parliamentary systems, the Head of State (President or Crown) appoints the Prime Minister (or Chancellor, in German-speaking countries) from the majority party. If no party has a majority, then there is usually some formal mechanism (a negotiated coalition agreement, or a vote in the Parliament) to ensure that the Prime Minister/Chancellor has the support of the majority of the Legislature. No such mechanism existed in the Weimar system. Instead, the President appointed a Chancellor whom he believed could command the support of the Reichstag. As long as the Chancellor’s proposed legislation passed the Assembly, it was assumed that he had the confidence of that body. However, if the Chancellor authored a proposal that failed, then he “lost the confidence” of the Reichstag, which triggered either a new Presidential appointment to the job, or even new elections. In the fourteen years of Weimar government (counting the Provisional Government), there were twenty different Cabinet/Governments, thirteen men serving as Chancellor, and eight elections for Reichstag (including five between 1928-1933). Of those twenty Cabinet/Governments, at least half did not have a party membership reflecting the majority of the Reichstag.

One of the other key factors that led to the collapse of the Weimar system was the peace imposed by the Allies at Versailles in 1919. France and Belgium, where most of the key battles took place, demanded heavy reparations from Germany, especially in the form of payments for economic loss. Alsace-Lorraine (an area that had been warred over for centuries) was returned to France. The neighboring Ruhr and Rhine River Valleys, which were the key industrial engines of Germany, were to be occupied by the Allies for up to twenty years, with those countries being given the first right to the area’s rich coal deposits. Large portions of eastern Prussia (including several large estates belonging to the old Junker class) were annexed to the re-formed Poland (which had been carved up by Austria, Prussia, and Russia back in 1815 at Vienna). The resentment at being treated like a conquered people, as well as the economic collapse brought on by reparations and the larger Great Depression of 1929, fueled those extremist political movements which sought to undermine the Republic. The Provisional Government which had accepted the Versailles terms (not that they had any real choice in the matter) was particularly resented. Many of those same leaders that had been forced to accede to the Versailles Treaty later held prominent roles in the early days of the Weimar system. But many Nationalists, especially the NSDAP leader Adolf Hitler, never forgave the “stab in the back”.

As the Reichstag struggled with maintaining stable alliances that could produce answers to these pressing economic and social pressures, the President (at the time, Paul von Hindenburg, an aged former Commander of German forces in World War I, and a conservative Junker) began to rely more on the powers of his office to try and lead the country. Although the drafters of the Weimar Constitution had intended for the President to serve as a counterweight to what they feared would be a Reichstag dominated by political radicals, they did not anticipate the assembly itself becoming paralyzed by faction. The Constitution contained a provision (Article 48) which allowed the President to rule by emergency decree in limited situations. From 1928-1933, Hindenburg called five Reichstag elections. None of these resulted in a governing coalition, so the President began using his Article 48 powers to appoint minority Chancellors (all of whom lost votes of confidence in short order). Finally, in March 1933, Hindenburg invited Adolf Hitler, leader of the growing NSDAP (National Socialist Party) to serve as Chancellor. Hitler then persuaded the President to use his emergency powers to ban several political parties (including the Social Democrats and Communists, which were the next two largest parties in the Reichstag at the time). The new government then transferred all powers to itself (stripping the legislative body of any remaining authority). President Hindenburg died at the age of 86 the following year, and Hitler merged the offices of President and Chancellor, declaring himself “Fuhrer” (Leader). Thus was born the Third Empire (Third Reich).

It is assumed that the reader is at least somewhat familiar with the key events of World War II. Hitler and his Nazi party pledged to restore Germany to its economic, military, and political dominance (hence the emphasis in Nazi propaganda on the “Third Reich”, which Hitler tried to portray as the logical continuance of the Empires of Charlemagne and Bismarck). However, the devastation of the First World War and the Great Depression made that very difficult. A tactic which Hitler would use to effective (and devastating) ends was to blame Germany’s opponents. These opponents included not just its traditional rivals such as France, England, and Russia, but INTERNAL groups such as Socialists, Communists, trade unions, Liberals, and religious minorities (especially Jews). Hitler also demanded “lebensraum” (living space) for Germans, and started to claw back some of the territories that had been reallocated at Versailles. Annexation of the Czech province of Sudetenland (1938) was agreed to by other European leaders (at the Munich Conference) as a concession to avoid war. However, the following year, Germany annexed two of the remaining regions of Czechoslovakia, and then (with the assurance of Soviet Russia that they would share the spoils), Hitler’s Army invaded Poland in September 1939. That invasion provoked the outbreak of World War II. Eventually, Germany would ally itself with Italy and Japan (the Axis Powers). The original allies were led by Britain and France, and eventually grew to include many other countries in Northern and Western Europe. Hitler turned on his Soviet allies in June 1941, and then Japan attacked the American Naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii six months later, which brought the United States onto the Allied side as well.

By the end of the European war, in May 1945, Germany had been invaded and divided into four zones of occupation (the United States, Britain, France, and Soviet Union each controlling a zone). It is estimated that at least 50 million people died during World War II, including six million European Jews who were systematically arrested, interned in concentration camps, and murdered (the “Holocaust”). One of the last deaths was Hitler himself, who committed suicide in the final week of the European war, as the Allied armies were closing in on Berlin.

1.4 – Two Germanies, the Basic Law, and Reunification

With Germany divided and occupied at the end of 1945, the Allied powers could have imposed terms on the defeated Empire, similar to what had happened at Versailles in 1919. However, the four major Allied powers quickly settled into the two camps that would contest the Cold War for the next forty years. Although the “Big Three” (Soviet, British, and American) leaders had agreed to cooperate in the governing of their zones at the war-time conferences at Yalta and Potsdam, those agreements broke down over issues related to refugee resettlement, allocation of agricultural and industrial supplies between the zones, the role of non-Communist political parties in the Soviet sector, and even which currency could be used as legal tender. The Soviets imposed a blockade on the western sectors of Berlin (that city was located in the eastern [Soviet] zone, but was itself divided into four separate zones) in 1948. The Americans and British responded with the Berlin Airlift, which delivered 2.3 million tons of food, coal, and other supplies, over the next 15 months. The Soviets ended the blockade in May 1949, but the lack of trust between the two sides continued. The Communist party had already boycotted Berlin’s city elections in December 1948, which resulted in two city governments (one for the eastern [Soviet] zone, the other for the three western zones). Just days after the end of the blockade, the three western zones in the rest of the country combined to form the Federal Republic of Germany (the FRG, or West Germany). The Soviet zone was renamed the German Democratic Republic (the GDR, or East Germany). That country, for the next forty years, operated as a one-party Communist state. Like its fellow Warsaw Pact members (Poland, Hungary, Romania, and others) it was not formally part of the Soviet Union, but relied heavily on that power for trade, military defense, and foreign alliances. The western part of Berlin (which was surrounded on all sides by East Germany) remained technically under American, French, and British military occupation (because of certain clauses in the Potsdam agreement), but those Allies allowed the city broad powers of self-rule. It was technically not a part of the Federal Republic, but considered itself a “de facto” (in fact) State of West Germany (even if it didn’t have “de jure” [in law] status).

Delegates from the three larger western zones (each Lander, or State, in those areas, had elected assemblies in the immediate post-war years) met at Bonn near the end of the airlift, and ratified the “Grundgesetz” (Basic Law), which would serve as West Germany’s Constitution. However, the Western Allies, as well as most of the delegates themselves, were careful to NOT call this document a Constitution (“Verfassung”). This agreement was intended to be provisional only, until all of Germany (including the Eastern/Communist zone, as well as occupied West Berlin) could be unified into a single state.

For most of West Germany’s history, the country was a key ally to the United States, Britain, and the other Western powers. It joined the NATO alliance in 1955, and agreed to host several key US military installations (the Air Force base at Ramstein and Army barracks at Grafenwohr are still two of the largest American military centers outside the US). Despite strong pacifist and anti-nuclear-weapons movements in Western Germany (which will be discussed in later sections), the FRG remained, for most of its history, strongly within the NATO and Western alliances. The two Germanies finally granted diplomatic recognition to each other in 1972 (although they never formally had embassies in each other’s territories, only “permanent missions”).

In East Germany, as mentioned before, a single-party (Communist) state was established. That country, along with most of the other “Eastern Bloc” nations, formed the Warsaw Pact (a Soviet-led counter to NATO) in 1955. Travel and trade with the West was severely restricted (after the end of the 1948-49 blockade, East Germany provided for restricted land and air corridors between West Berlin and the rest of West Germany, but Eastern Bloc residents were mostly prohibited from using these transportation networks).

East Germany’s isolation, Communist ideology, as well as its dependence on the Soviet bloc, hampered its economic growth and cultural vitality. Although the Warsaw Bloc nations, including East Germany, maintained strong militaries, the Communist system eventually began unable to keep up with the more market-oriented economies of Western Europe. As the Soviet system began to crumble in the late 1980s, the East Germany government, led by Erich Honecker, refused to follow the lead of the Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Premier who called for glasnost (“openness”) and perestroika (“restructuring”). Contested election results in May 1989 led to mass protests against the GDR government, and when Hungary opened its border with the Austria the following month, many East German citizens took advantage of the opportunity to flee to the west (through Czechoslovakia, also a Warsaw Pact member). In response to these events, Honecker ordered the closure of the East German border with its southern neighbor, and then, despite urging from Gorbachev to open negotiations with opposition groups, authorized soldiers to shoot protestors during a large rally in Leibniz (in early October 1989). Rival factions in the East Germany Communist party succeeded in overturning that order, and less than 10 days later, voted to remove Honecker from office. On the night of November 9^th, 1989, East Berlin residents, taking advantage of a temporary lifting of the travel ban, began to chip away at pieces of the wall that divided the city in two. East German soldiers, without any orders as to how to respond, stood by and watched. The Berlin Wall, erected at the height of the Cold War in 1961, had fallen.

Within the next two years, every Communist government (including that in the Soviet Union) had been replaced by a more pluralistic and democratic form. East Germany, which had long claimed to be the only legitimate state for the entire country, agreed to reunification with the West in October 1990, less than a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Basic Law, which the FRG had adopted in 1949 as a temporary and provisional mechanism, was recognized as the charter for a reunified Germany, which would finally be a single state again after forty years of division.

Section 2 – Ethnic and Religious Background

Although the vast majority of the country are ethnic Germans, the country has experienced a large increase in its foreign-born population in recent years. Although Germany, especially since reunification in 1990, has long welcomed migration from other parts of the world, the surge of non-German speaking immigrants, especially from the Middle East and Eastern Europe, has put a strain on the social welfare system, and led to a political backlash in some parts of the country.

Germany also has a long history of religious strife (the Protestant Reformation started in Germany), although, like in many parts of Western Europe, the traditional split between Catholics and Protestants has become much less salient in the 20^th and 21^st centuries. Germany’s role in the Holocaust, and the hollowing out of its once-thriving Jewish population during World War II, remains a contentious subject in the country. Only recently has the nation begun to come to grips with the consequences of that era. Furthermore, the rise in Middle Eastern and Muslim immigration has led to concerns among some Germans about how to assimilate those new residents into the larger society.

German is the only official language in the nation, although the government does recognize four smaller regional languages (Sorbian, Danish, North Frisian, and Romani), which are spoken by long-standing ethnic minorities living along border regions (BBC).

2.1 – Ethnic Makeup and Migration

In 1990 (the same year as reunification), ethnic Germans made up 93% of the country’s population. In 2023 (a third of a century later), that percentage had dropped to 84% (Federal Statistical Office 2023). Migration to Germany in recent years can be attributed to primarily three key policies. In 1961, Germany and Turkey signed a guest-worker agreement (the “Gasterbeiter” program), which was intended to bring in temporary workers for lower-skilled tasks such as mining and construction. Although this arrangement was to provide for temporary employment, large numbers of those workers stayed in Germany for longer terms, with many bringing families with them. By 1990, approximately 2 million Turkish guest-workers were living more or less permanently in the country (out of a population of about 79 million at the time). Today, Turks make up the largest contingent of non-German residents.

Germany’s membership in the European Union, which allows for expedited work permits across national borders, also makes it an attractive destination for laborers from less-developed EU countries. In 2023, 36% of the foreign-born population in Germany came from other EU members, with the vast majority coming from the relatively poorer countries in Eastern and Southern Europe.

As one of the leading economies in the EU, Germany has also played a key role in several regional agreements regarding humanitarian migration onto the Continent. In 2015, largely in response to the civil war in Syria and a large influx of African migration into southern Europe (especially Turkey and Italy), Angela Merkel (Germany’s Chancellor) announced that her government would allow asylum seekers to seek refuge in Germany directly (without waiting in the first EU country they entered, which had been long-standing policy in the Union). In 2022, in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany and other EU powers agreed to an expedited visa program for Ukrainian war refugees. In 2023, according to the Federal Statistical Office (Germany’s Census), Ukrainians and Syrians were the next two-largest contingents (after Turks) of the foreign-born population living in Germany. As we will see in subsequent sections, this rapid increase in the non-German population has led to some concern, especially from political parties on the Right, about the impact of this immigration on Germany’s economy and society.

2.2 – Germany’s Population Demographics

A major impetus for this boon in immigration lies in Germany’s shrinking birth-rate. Like many developed industrial societies, Germany is considered a Stage Five country in the traditional Demographic Transition Model, where the death-rate exceeds the birth-rate, and fertility drops below the necessary 2.1 births per woman in order to maintain a steady population. Germany’s birth rate is 1.46 per woman (as of 2022), according to World Bank data. Like most countries in this situation, Germany has chosen to open up its immigration system in order to have enough workers (and tax-payers) to staff its economy (and to support its comparatively generous social safety net). Even with this increase in migration, Germany’s population is actually estimated to begin shrinking after 2025, while its two chief economic rivals in Western Europe (France and the United Kingdom), are expected to continue moderate population growth over the next fifty years.

2.3 – Religious Identity

It has already been mentioned that Charlemagne, Otto, and their successors held dual titles: King of the Germans AND Holy Roman Emperor. The latter title was intended, by the Catholic Church, to identity the defender of the faith in the western part of Europe. However, in the early 16^th century, critics of the Church’s political and theological positions began to resist its hegemony not only in Germany, but in other parts of Europe. The Protestant Reformation is generally thought to begin with the publishing of Martin Luther’s 95 Theses (a series of critiques of the Pope and Catholic Bishops) at the Chapel in Wittenberg, in October 1517.

Lutheranism, as the new creed was generally called, quickly found adherents not only among some of the peasantry, but especially among the growing class of skilled town workers, as well as local rulers who had long resented the influence of the Pope. The Peace of Augsburg (1555) recognized the ability of individual Kings, Princes, and Dukes within the larger Empire to choose the official religion for their realms. However, this treaty did not recognize the validity of other religious faiths (such as Anabaptism and Calvinism), nor did it provide for the rights of individual believers who found themselves living in a kingdom or principality recognizing a different faith. A civil war within the Empire (the Thirty Years War of 1618-1648) ended with the Peace of Westphalia, which extended official recognition to Calvinism, as well as individual conscience rights for any Christian. Even though the three major Christian faiths could claim adherents across Germany, the general pattern of Catholic dominance in the southern areas (especially Austria and Bavaria), with Protestants being more common in northern and eastern Germany (especially Prussia), can be traced back to this period in German history.

Germany’s Jewish population has long been small, compared to most of its regional neighbors. One of the clauses in the Westphalia treaties provided for religious freedom for Jews in the newly-formed Dutch Republic (today’s Netherlands). Other large Jewish populations lived east of Germany, in Poland and Romania. However, despite their small numbers (about 500,000, or about 1% of the pre-WWII population), German Jews represented a cultural and economic elite. One study estimates that about 20% of all corporate directors in Germany in the 30 years prior to World War Two were Jewish, and that Jews were heavily represented in professions such as law and medicine. However, Hitler’s “Final Solution” (the eradication of European Judaism) devastated this community, as well as those larger Jewish populations in Holland, Poland, and Romania (all of which were occupied by Nazi armies). Germany’s Jewish population was reduced to just a few thousand survivors by 1945 (Windolf n.d.)

Germany’s commemoration of the Holocaust has long been mired in controversy. In the years immediately following the war, most remembrances focused on elite resistance to Hitler (such as the failed von Stauffenberg plot in July 1944), or on memorials to all of Germany’s war dead (both military and civilian). By the mid-1970s, Western Federal Republic officials began to hold memorial services every November 9^th (the date in 1938 on which the Frankfurt Synagogue was destroyed). However, in the East, Communist Party observances tended to emphasis the “defeat of Fascism” more generally, without specific reference to the targeted victims. In 1995, the re-unified German government finally set an official annual commemoration on January 27^th (the date on which Soviet troops liberated the Auschwitz concentration camp in 1945). Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial, which is still criticized today for its abstract design, as well as its lack of names of victims, was completed in 2005, sixty years after the end of the war (Schiller 2022).

In contrast to the small Jewish remnant, Germany’s Muslim population is one of the fastest-growing on the European content. As mentioned in Section 2.1, on ethnic migration, Germany’s status as a destination for Middle Eastern refugees (particularly from Syria), and the long-standing guest-worker program (from Turkey) is a key reason for this growth. From 2010 to 2016, the Muslim population is estimated to have grown from 3.3 million (4.1% of the population) to just under 5 million (6.1%). By 2023, that number was estimated at over 5.5 million (6.6% of the population). A Pew Research study in 2017 found that public opinion was divided on the effect of this growing wave of migrants. Although 65% of poll respondents said they had a “mostly” or “very” favorable view of Muslim immigrants, 61% agreed with the statement that “Muslims want to be distinct from the rest of German society”. The same poll showed that 61% of Germans worry that Muslim immigration “increases the likelihood of terrorism” (Pew 2017).

Another trend to mention is the rise in secularism and a lack of any religious belief among a large number of Germans. While this trend is similar to that found in many industrialized societies in Western Europe (as well as North America), there is a marked regional pattern found in Germany. The Federal Statistical Office collects data about religious membership (because registered church members pay a tax which goes to support the religious and social programs of their preferred denomination). Forty years of official state atheism in Communist East Germany has led to a markedly reduced level of religious identity in that part of the country. In fact, almost every district in the former Democratic Republic reports that more than 50% of their citizens adhere to no religious belief or affiliation. Meanwhile, large swaths of western Germany show majority (or significant plurality) membership in either a Catholic or Protestant church (estimates are that less than 5% of all Christian church members actually attend on a weekly basis).

Section 3 – Political Culture and Civil Society

The Basic Law (which serves as Germany’s Constitution) provides for an extensive set of protections for individual rights. In fact, the first 19 articles (out of 146 total) deal exclusively with “fundamental rights”. Most of these rights apply to all persons in Germany, regardless of citizenship status. In fact, the very first article begins with this sentence: “Human dignity shall be inviolable.” After the horrors of the Nazi period, the drafters of Germany’s new regime seemed determined to guarantee the primacy of basic civil rights.

3.1 – Protections of Minorities

Article 3 of the Basic Law provides a sweeping anti-discrimination clause, prohibiting favoritism on the basis of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland or origin, religious faith, political opinion, or disability. It also specifically requires the government to provide for affirmative action policies on the basis of sex. However, this policy has been limited by a European Court of Justice ruling in 1996, which found that the State of Bremen’s quota policy for public workers violated European Union rules (Feminist Majority Foundation 1985).

3.2 – Anti Military and Nuclear activism

Even though Germany has long been a key member of the NATO defensive alliance, there is a long history in German politics of protests against the American military presence. In 1979, NATO announced the “double-track decision”, which would expand the network of short-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe (with the majority placed in West Germany), while at the same time trying to negotiate a limit of intermediate- and longer-range weapons with the Soviet Union. This decision sparked mass protests in West Germany, and is often considered a key spark in turning the Green movement from a loose network of environmental and anti-nuclear-power advocates into a formal political force (the Green party, as we will learn later in Section 5, was founded in 1980, and won seats in the national Parliament as early as 1982). Several large rallies, with hundreds of thousands of protestors, occurred annually from 1981-1986 (Holmes 2014: Chapter 3).

3.3 – Restrictions on Nazi symbols

Article 21 of the Basic Law declares that political parties that “undermine democratic order” are unconstitutional, and several other sections of the constitutional document lay the ground for what became know to be “de-Nazification”, where the West German government fired civil servants who had served the National Socialist government of the Third Reich. The party ban has been used twice (in the 1950s) to ban anti-democratic parties, but the Federal Constitutional Court has taken a much dimmer view of those efforts in recent years. In Section 5, we will learn about the failed attempt to ban the National Democratic Party in 2017, and more recent controversy over the legality of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) Party, which is rising in the polls.

This sensitivity about German’s Nazi past extends to criminal law. Displays of Nazi symbols (such as the swastika) can be punished by fines, and even up to three years in jail. However, the law is applied inconsistently, depending on the context (such as educational displays, news broadcasts, and artwork). The Federal Court of Justice has struggled to balance this concern about the dangerous power of Nazi symbols with German’s tradition as an open society, with a commitment to free speech (Bierbach and Kaminski 2019)

Section 4 – Political Participation and Parties

As indicated above, Germany in the post-war era, especially in the West, has an established record of high levels of activism and political participation. In national elections (such as for the national and European Parliaments), Germany’s voter turnout has consistently been above 70% since reunification in 1990. This is just slightly below the percentages found in other Northern European countries (such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), but much higher than other traditional Western European powers such as France and the United Kingdom. As the graph below shows, turnout in the former East Germany lags that of the West (albeit only slightly). This is a trend found across Europe since the end of the Cold War, where voter turnout in former Warsaw Pact and Soviet satellite states have only recently begun to rise above 50% (Voter Turnout Database).

4.1 – Electoral System for the Bundestag

Germany’s Parliamentary structure, and the powers given to each chamber, will be explored in the next section. The lower chamber, the Bundestag, is elected directly by the citizens of Germany. However, the system used for this is quite complex, and often confusing (even to Germany’s own voters). It is considered a form of Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting, where voters have both a representative from their local district, as well as a group of members who represent the breadth of ideological views. Each voter casts two votes on the same ballot. The first vote is for an individual representative from that voter’s particular district (there are 299 districts, allocated proportionally by State/Land population). The winner in each district is determined by a simple first-past-the-post/plurality method (the same method used in US House of Representatives and British House of Commons elections). The second vote is for a party list (each political party nominates a list of candidates). An additional 299 seats are then distributed (using the same general proportion by Land population) by the percentage that each party receives in this second vote.

However, a common outcome occurs in Germany (and other MMP systems used around the world): the number of seats won in individual districts (especially by the major parties) can be higher than the percentage of seats that are earned when looking at the proportions of the second votes (these are referred to as “overhangs”). Germany also has a minimum threshold rule: a party must gain at least 5% of the second vote nationally, or at least 3 individual district seats, in order to actually claim its seats in the Bundestag. This minimum was specifically adopted in order to avoid the splintering of parties which occurred in the Weimar era. An exception to this rule exists for parties that represent one of the four recognized minority groups, which is how the South Schleswig Voters Association, which represents the Danes and Frisians of that State, holds one seat (Thurau 2022).

Any party who meets the threshold rule can then qualify for the allocation of seats under the second vote. In the 2021 election, for example, the Party of the Left (Die Linke) only captured 4.9% of the second vote, but won exactly three seats outright. Because of the overhang seats, and then a second rule which provides for the addition to “adjustment seats” in order to maintain proportionality, the Left parlayed those three district wins into 39 seats in the next Parliament. These two rules (providing for “overhang” and “adjustment” seats) have caused the Bundestag to grow from its “natural size” of 598 representatives to an actual member of 736 in the current body (as of the 2021 election).

A reform to this system was passed by the SPD/Green/FDP coalition government in 2023, and will be in place for the next election in 2025. The original proposal would have eliminated overhang seats and required an absolute 5% minimum on the second vote to claim any wins. The Left Party and the CSU (a Catholic-dominated party that only contests elections in Bavaria) sued in the Federal Constitutional Court. In July 2024, the Court ruled that the size of the Bundestag could be capped at 630 members, but that individual district winners must still be seated. However, those parties that drop below the 5% minimum, and any claiming overhang seats, are not guaranteed any additional seats during the adjustment calculations. It is expected that the government that emerges out of the upcoming 2025 election will have to make further changes to this law in order to comply with Court’s ruling.

Bundestag elections must occur every four years. However, it is possible for early, or “snap” elections to be called prior to the full four year period. This scenario will be described in Section 5.

4.2 – Political Parties

In the immediate postwar years in West Germany, most elections were contested by two larger broad-based parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Two smaller parties, the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), have also played significant roles in every national election since 1949 (and most of the governing coalitions as well). In recent decades, especially since reunification, several smaller parties (the Greens, Die Linke/The Left, and the Alternative for Germany) have emerged on the scene, and challenged the dominance of the traditional party structure.

4.2.1 – Christian Democrats

As has been mentioned before, parties in the Second Reich era and the Weimar Republic period tended to form not only for ideological reasons, but along confessional lines as well. For example, two of the key center-right parties in the Weimar era were the Centre Party (which was predominantly Catholic) and the German National Peoples Party (which appealed to the Protestant Junker class). Although both parties held similar positions on fiscal and social policy, they remained divided over issues of religious identity. In the postwar era, the remnants of these and other center-right parties merged to form the Christian Democratic Union, which became the most dominant force in West Germany outside of Bavaria. Under its first leader (and the first Chancellor of the FRG), Konrad Adenauer, the CDU focused on restoring the German economy in the postwar years. It appealed to many of the remnants of the traditional nationalist and anti-Socialist parties as well. The party’s platform in this era emphasized a pro-Western foreign policy, opposition to Socialism and Communism, and industrial and labor policies centered around economic liberalism (free-market economics). The CDU held the Chancellorship for twenty years after the war (1949-1969).

After thirteen years in political opposition (1969-1982), the CDU won again during leader (and new Chancellor) Helmut Kohl. Kohl continued the traditional CDU policy of anti-Communism and strong ties with NATO, and engineered the reunification of Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. However, the lagging effects of industrial recession from the early 1980s, as well as the high costs of raising the standard of living in former East Germany, forced Kohl to raise taxes (which went against traditional CDU platform principles). His government lost power in 1998.

Angela Merkel, the first woman Chancellor of Germany, and the first holder of that office raised in the former East Germany, became party Chair of the CDU in 2000, and then led the party to victory in 2005. The party that Merkel led, however, became much more socially liberal (for example, she called for a vote in Bundestag in 2017 to legalize same-sex marriage, despite her personal opposition). Partially as result of being in a Grand Coalition (this term will be explained in Section 5) with the SPD for much of this period, Merkel found it necessary to compromise in order to maintain her Chancellorship. It was her government that agreed to phase out nuclear power in 2011, and which opened up Germany to high levels of humanitarian migration in 2015.

After Merkel’s retirement in 2021, the CDU found itself back in opposition. The party’s new leader, Friedrich Merz, will lead the party into the next Bundestag election in 2025. Merz rose to power in part because of concern among CDU members that the party, under Merzel, had lost touch with its traditional voter base. Merz has called for the nuclear power ban to be reversed, for delaying some of the provisions of the 2020 European Green Deal, and for curbing immigration.

In Bavaria, the second-most populous State (and the most predominately Catholic), the CDU does not contest elections at any level (local, State, or Federal). Instead, the center-right is represented by a separate “sister party”, the Christian Social Union (CSU). This arrangement is partially a holdover from the Weimar era, which featured a Bavarian splinter from the larger Catholic Centre Party. It continued into the postwar era partially as a result of Bavarian nationalism (as a counter to the more separatist Bavaria Party, which faded in power in the 1960s). Even today, the CSU is considered the more conservative of the two parties: it emphasizes Catholic social teachings on issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, and supports the ability of church-run institutions (such as schools and medical facilities) to equally access state funds. Every CDU government has relied on support from the CSU for its majority, and the two parties sit next to each other in the Bundestag. They also coordinate national campaign strategy during Federal elections.

4.2.2 – Social Democratic Party

Germany’s oldest remaining political party dates back to 1875, when several smaller parties representing labor unions, the working class, and some Socialist factions merged together to form the Socialist Workers Party. Even though Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm I banned Socialist organizations in 1878, the Party continued to win support in local and regional elections. After the ban was lifted in 1890, the party adopted its current name (Social Democratic Party, or SDP).

Although officially Marxist during most of its pre-1949 existence, the SDP often functioned more like a more moderate Social Democratic movement. Rather than preaching revolution, the SDP, like its Labor Party counterpart in England, supported economic reforms within the existing political system (such as maximum hour laws, minimum wage rules, and protections for child labor). It quietly supported the war effort in 1914-1918 (which led to further splits within the Socialist and Communist factions). As was mentioned earlier, the SDP was one of the key major parties during the Weimar period, and participated in several of the government coalitions (including several times when it controlled the Chancellors office). After being banned by the Nazis in 1933, it existed only as an underground protest and reform movement. At the end of World War II, the party found itself split in half by occupation. The eastern members were forced, by the Soviet occupying forces, to merge with the Communists to form the Socialist Unity Party (this was the group that would rule East Germany as a single-party dictatorship from 1949-1989).

The western remnants of the SDP re-formed in the immediate postwar years, and stood for election in every Federal Republic Bundestag (and unified German) election since 1949. During the early years of the Republic, it held the second-largest number of seats in the Bundestag, but remained in opposition. In 1959, the party formally amended its platform to renounce nationalization of industry, and to emphasize that it wished to reform capitalism, not destroy it. This shift, combined with the popularity of West Berlin Mayor Willie Brandt, led the SDP into its first victory in the Bundestag elections of 1969.

As Germany’s first SDP Chancellor, Brandt represented the more moderate wing of the party. He reaffirmed West Germany’s role in NATO, encouraged German participation in European integration (the forerunners to the modern European Union), and remained silent on US policy in Vietnam (despite pressure from many in his own party to critique a key ally). However, Brandt did break with West German tradition by signing the treaties that recognized the Soviet Union and East Germany. Brandt’s government also expanded federal spending on health care, transportation, education, and welfare.

However, a significant faction of SDP members still held on to more radical beliefs. One of Brandt’s secretaries was exposed as a secret agent for the Stasi (the Eastern German secret police) in 1973. Brandt resigned as Chancellor in 1974 and turned the office over to fellow SDP-er Helmut Schmidt. The party maintained its governing coalition through 1982, when it returned to opposition against the CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

As was mentioned above, Kohl’s government lost support over the costs of reunification (especially an unpopular tax hike in 1991). The SDP returned to power after the 1998 elections, under the Chancellorship of former Lower Saxony Governor Gerhard Schroder. At the same time, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair (of the Labor Party) was pursuing his “Third Way” approach to Socialist government policy, with an emphasis on tax cuts, balanced budgets, and rolling back government spending on social welfare programs. Schroder tried to implement similar policies in Germany, although his coalition partners (the Greens) and some of the more left-wing members of his own party resisted some of these proposals. In the 2005 election, which brought Angela Merkel of the CDU to power, the SDP retained enough seats to force a Grand Coalition, and even held a majority of the Cabinet posts (despite holding fewer Bundestag seats) from 2005-2009.

The SDP later served as partner in Merkel’s last two Cabinets (2013-2021), with Olaf Scholz, the current party leader, as Finance Minister, and then Vice Chancellor. When Scholz rose to the Chancellorship in 2021, he was forced into a three-party coalition with the Greens and the more free-market oriented Free Democrats (FDP). This “traffic light coalition” (red for the SDP, yellow for the FDP, and green for Alliance 90/Greens) arrangement had existed in some State governments in the 1990s, but this was the first time that it had been attempted on the Federal level. As a leader in the European Union, and as a reflection of the Greens and his own party’s positions on climate policy, Scholz’ government has tried to maintain Germany’s commitments to de-nuclearization, transition away from fossil fuels, and alternative energy subsidies. However, the challenges brought by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine (Russia is a major supplier of natural gas to Western Europe, especially Germany) have put enormous pressure on the German economy. In December 2024, Scholz’ government lost a vote of confidence, and early elections have been called for February 2025. Early polls indicate that the SDP (and Scholz) are expected to lose (Politico).

4.2.3 – Free Democratic Party

The Free Democratic Party (FDP) was formed in 1948 as a coalition of various anti-monarchist, anti-clerical, and liberal factions. Liberalism, as a political philosophy in Germany, can be traced back to the founding of the Second Reich in 1871, although it tended to factionalize prior to 1933. Liberals of that era tended to emphasize expansion of the right to vote, a weakening of the role of the Churches in public affairs, and low taxes and free trade. However, various liberal parties of the Second Reich and Weimar eras tended to fissure around which of those issues to emphasize, as well as over questions of foreign policy and military preparedness. In the postwar era, the FDP has advocated for less government spending, lower taxes and regulations on the private sector, and a separation of education and social services from the influence of the Catholic and Lutheran Churches. However, the party has also experienced some internal divisions over foreign policy (especially as it relates to spending on military preparedness and foreign aid) and environmental protection.

They have generally been the third largest party in terms of Bundestag seats (except for the 2013-2017 period, when they had no Bundestag representation), and they have been a partner in more coalition governments than any other party in modern German history. At various times since 1949, the party has shown flexibility in its platform, and thus has been comfortable aligning itself with either the CDU/CSU or the SDP to form a government. The current FDP leader, Christian Lindner, served as Finance Minister in the Scholz government until November 2024, when he was dismissed by the Chancellor over disagreements about budget policy. That firing led to FDP leaving the coalition, and then the vote of no confidence which triggered the upcoming February 2025 election.

4.2.4 – The Greens (Alliance 90/Greens)

West Germany’s version of the Green party (Die Grunen) dates back to the anti-nuclear and peace movements of the late 1970s and 1980s. By 1980, Green candidates were running for local and state office, and they first entered the Bundestag in 1982. The party platform has long centered around issues such as pacificism, limiting the influence of NATO on German foreign policy, restrictions on industrialization, and the rights of sexual minorities. A scandal which exposed several Party officers as Stasi (East Germany secret police) informants, as well as efforts by some Greens to slow the reunification process, undercut the Party’s successes in the early 1990s. They were able to maintain some representation in the Bundestag thanks to a merger with Alliance 90, a group of small anti-Communist (but still left-wing) parties from East Germany. The formal name for the current Party (Alliance 90/Greens) reflects this merged history.

The Greens have participated in three Federal governments, each time as junior partner with the SDP (1998-2002, 2002-2005, and 2021-2024). The current Green party has maintained most of the core principles in domestic policy, particularly regarding individual liberties and a strong emphasis on environmental sustainability. Although its early iterations opposed nuclear power and the US/NATO military presence, those positions have softened somewhat in recent years. Germany’s over-dependence on Russian gas has created concern about how to balance affordable energy with environmental concerns. Russia’s human rights record, including its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has caused the Green leadership to re-evaluate how NATO and other European alliances could be used to blunt Russian aggression.

4.2.5 – Die Linke (The Left)

When East Germany’s Communist government fell in 1989, the ruling Socialist Unity Party expelled most of its leadership (including Erich Honecker, the last ruler of the old GDR), and reorganized itself as a Social Democratic Party (adopting the name “Party of Democratic Socialism”/PDS). However, unlike the more dominant SDP in the West, it still contained a significant membership that ascribed to a Marxist-Leninist philosophy of anti-capitalism. In the early years of reunification, PDS won significant support in the State legislative elections in most of the former East, but only had modest showings in Bundestag (Federal) elections.

In 2005, as a response to SDP Chancellor Schroder’s economic reforms, a group of western SDP members, representing the left flank of that party, broke off and formed a new “Labor and Social Justice” Party. In the federal elections later that year, the PDS in the East and Labor and Social Justice (in the West) agreed to not complete directly with each other in the same districts and States, and to form an alliance in Parliament with whatever members could be elected. This joint list approach yielded 53 seats, the fourth-largest party grouping in the 2005 Bundestag. In 2007, the two parties merged to form “Die Linke” (usually called “The Left” or “The Left Party” in English).

The Left’s platform calls for extensive tax increases, restrictions on corporate mergers and acquisitions, and large investments in public works. It is the most pacifist of all German political parties: it would remove Germany from the NATO alliance, and ban the deployment of Germany’s military forces outside its borders. Although it is a nationwide party, it consistently performs better in the former States of East Germany, largely by appealing to frustration with the ongoing lag in economic development since reunification. The Russia-Ukraine war has created a fracture within The Left. Some of the more pacifist elements support Ukraine, seeing Russia as the aggressor. However, others, concerned about what they perceive as “fascist elements” within the Ukrainian government, have rejected sanctions against Russia. In the upcoming February 2025 election, an alternative party, dubbed the “Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance – Reason and Justice” will appear on the ballot (Wagenknecht, a member of the Bundestag, is the leader of the more pro-Russian faction).

4.2.6 – Alternative for Germany (AfD)

The “Alternative fur Deutschland” (AfD) began in 2013 as an offshoot of the CDU, opposed to Chancellor Merkel’s European Union policies (especially a bailout of government debt in Greece and Spain). Its original leadership focused on economic issues, with emphasis on public debt and what it saw as Germany’s increasing interdependence on the Eurozone. In the 2017 federal election, it won the third-highest number of seats.

However, in the years since that high-water mark, the party leadership, as well as much of its rank-and-file membership, has taken a turn towards the populist Right. In the wake of Germany’s acceptance of migrants from Syria and other parts of the Middle East after 2015, it has advocated for closing Germany’s borders, leaving the European Union, and a ban on the public display of Muslim symbols. Many AfD leaders also support Russia in its Ukrainian war, although the motivation is based more on an opposition to European integration and a resentment against Ukrainian migrants. Like The Left, AfD has its strongest levels of support in the States of the former East Germany, which many observers ascribe as a protest vote against globalization and economic integration.

The original founders of AfD have mostly quit the party over this shift to what they fear is a renewal of xenophobia. Some local party leaders have been accused of displaying symbols that represent Germany’s Nazi past, and others have been accused of making antisemitic remarks. As mentioned in Section 3, Article 21 of the Basic Law does allow federal authorities to ban political parties that “undermine the democratic order”. However, such a ban would be immediately appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court, which has sole authority to interpret Germany’s Basic Law. In 1952, the Socialist Reich Party (which actively flouted the prohibition on the use of Nazi imagery) was successfully banned. Four years later, the same thing happened to the Communist Party in West Germany (even though it actually held seats in the Bundestag). However, an attempt to ban the National Democratic Party (another nationalist, populist faction) in 2017 was overturned by the Court. In October 2024, over a hundred Bundestag members filed a petition to ban AfD. However, the Scholz coalition collapsed, and the government disbanded, before a vote could be taken. No further action would be possible until after the next election in February 2025 (Thurau 2024). However, current polls show that the AfD could finish as high as second place. All of the other major parties have stated publicly that they would not enter into a governing coalition with the AfD (although the CDU has done so in a few State-level governments).

Section 5 – Political Institutions

Germany is a Federal Parliamentary Republic. That means that sovereignty (political power) is split between the national and State (Lander) governments, depending on the issue. This is somewhat unusual in Europe, where most systems are unitary, with the national government setting policy for the entire country. However, unlike the situation found in the United States (also a Federal system), Germany’s governmental structure is Parliamentary (similar to the United Kingdom).

5.1 – Executive

When the architects of West Germany’s new political system wrote the Basic Law in 1949, they took care to avoid one of the features that led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic. In the interwar period, German Presidents had broad powers to appoint (and dismiss) Chancellors. While the Reichstag (the lower chamber of Parliament) had the power to pass votes of no confidence on Chancellors, the President also had the ability to dismiss those officers, regardless of the opinion of the majority of the Legislative body. Also, because there was no formal mechanism for the Reichstag to approve new Chancellors, the President had wide latitude to appoint his preferred candidates. As we’ve already learned, this imbalance in power led to multiple elections between 1928-1933, as President von Hindenburg and the fractured Legislature struggled to reach consensus.

Under the Basic Law, the office of President exists, but it is more analogous to a figurehead (similar to the King of England, rather than the President of the United States). He (there has been no female President yet to date) signs all legislation passed by the legislative bodies, but the Chancellor (or another Federal Minister) must counter-sign the law as well. Presidents may veto laws that he believes to be unconstitutional, but all vetoes are reviewed by the Federal Constitutional Court (described below). The President represents Germany in matters of international affairs (signing treaties, attending ceremonies with other heads of state), but the policy-making process (such as the terms that actually end up in those treaties) belongs to the Chancellor and the other government Ministers.

Presidents serve for five-year terms, and can be elected for up to two consecutive terms (five of the twelve post-1949 Presidents have been elected to a second term, but only two of those served for the full ten years). Presidents are elected by a special Convention. The entire Bundestag membership serves as delegates; an equal number of delegates are appointed by the State (Land) governments. Convention elections are not set on a consistent five-year calendar (as Presidential elections are done in the US); several Conventions have been called early to replace a President who resigned, which then shifts the scheduling of the following Convention to allow the new officeholder to serve the full five years.

One area where the President has some authority is in nominating Chancellors. After each Bundestag election, the President consults with each political party leader (each party designates a candidate for Chancellor during the electoral campaign) to determine which party, or group of parties, has enough votes to form a government (i.e. to put together a group of Cabinet Ministers which has support from the majority of the lower chamber). The President will then nominate a Chancellor from whatever group can form a Cabinet. That nominee has to be approved by a majority vote of the Bundestag (this is a change from practice in the Weimar era). The President then appoints the remainder of the Cabinet Ministers, in consultation with the newly-elected Chancellor. If no Chancellor candidate can win a majority, the President does have the power to appoint the candidate with the largest number of votes (a plurality) to the office, but only after a period of time has passed, and after the Bundestag members themselves have had the opportunity to nominate other candidates. This last scenario, while possible under the Basic Law, has never happened.

Government have fallen in modern Germany due to votes of no confidence. However, it has occurred with much less frequency than in the Weimar era. This is due to two rules within the Basic Law. The first is that for an opposition party to successfully depose a Chancellor, they must propose an alternative candidate, who can garner the majority support of the existing Bundestag. This “constructive vote of no confidence” has only been used once. In 1982, the SDP government of Helmut Schmidt, which relied on support from the FDP as a junior partner, was replaced by the CDU-led Cabinet of Helmut Kohl. This occurred because the FDP leadership, frustrated with Schmidt’s budget policies, resigned their Cabinet seats, and then threw support to the CDU.

The Basic Law does also allow for the Chancellor to actually call for a “vote of confidence” on his or her own government. This may occur for a variety of reasons. Usually, it happens because one or more members of the governing coalition leave their parties and join the opposition, or, as occurred in 1982 and 2024, an entire party membership within the governing coalition resigns en masse from the Cabinet. A much rarer occurrence is when polling shows a major shift in support for each party, and the sitting Chancellor wants to test public support for his or her government (this is what occurred in 2005). However, the President must agree to call early elections after a failed vote of confidence. Alternatively, he could call on the opposition parties to try and form a government. This requirement has limited the use of the vote of no confidence in the postwar era (it has only happened four times since 1949).

5.2 – The Federal Cabinet (and the importance of Coalitions)

As hinted at before, most Executive power lies in the hands of the Chancellor and the Federal Cabinet. The Cabinet consists of the heads of each department (Minister of Finance, Defense Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, etc). The Basic Law invests broad policy-making power in the hands of the Chancellor. The Legislature must pass all laws and budgets, and the various Cabinet Ministers are tasked with implementing those directives. However, as the chief Executive of the Cabinet, the Chancellor has broad authority to advise (and even direct) those Ministry activities. Technically, the Chancellor can’t dismiss a Cabinet Minister (only the President can do that), but a tradition has emerged in German politics that recognizes the primacy of the Chancellor as head of his or her own government. Federal Presidents have tended to acquiesce to the preferences of the Chancellor, unless doing so would violate the law.

As has been implied several times up to now, German governments, like that found in many Parliamentary systems around the world, can consist of a simple majority of one party, or (more likely) a coalition of several parties. Given the fractured nature of the country’s political parties, majority governments are quite rare: only one of Konrad Adenauer’s four Cabinets (in the 1950s and early 1960s) was a majority government, consisting only of CDU and CSU members (as well as one German Party Minister; the German Party was a nationalist faction that faded from influence by the early 1960s). Every other German Cabinet since 1949 has required support from one or more other parties in order to obtain a majority to secure election.

All nine of Germany’s postwar Chancellors have come from either the CDU or the SDP. The most common junior partner has been the Free Democrats (FDP). That party’s platform, which mixes free-market economics with a more liberal view on social issues, allows it to have the flexibility to join either of the two major parties in Cabinet formation. Negotiations for coalition government always include some sort of compromise between the party leadership on pressing issues, and the Chancellor usually offers key Ministry positions to the junior partners. For example, in the current government, Olaf Scholz, the Chancellor (SDP) asked the President to appoint FDP leader Christian Lindner as Finance Minister, and agreed to adopt several FDP policy positions regarding public debt.

However, coalitions have not been without risk. Lindner’s austere financial positions have frustrated several Ministers of Scholz’ other coalition partner (the Greens), as well as some key Bundestag members in his own SDP party. Scholz’ dismissal of Lindner as Finance Minister in November 2024 led to the mass resignation of the other FDP Cabinet members, and the resulting vote of no confidence.

Chancellor (with party)	Years in Office	Cabinets (with party coalitions)
Konrad Adenauer (CDU)	1949-1963	1st (1949-53): CDU/CSU, FDP, DP*
		2nd (1953-57): CDU/CSU, FDP, DP*
		3rd (1957-61): CDU/CSU, DP*
		4th (1961-63): CDU/CSU, FDP
Ludwig Erhard (CDU)	1963-1966	1st (1963-65): CDU/CSU, FDP
		2nd (1965-66): CDU/CSU, FDP
Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU)	1966-1969	1st (1966-69): CDU/CSU, SDP
Will Brandt (SDP)	1969-1974	1st (1969-72): SDP, FDP
		2nd (1972-74): SDP, FDP
Helmut Schmidt (SDP)	1974-1982	1st (1974-76): SDP, FDP
		2nd (1976-80): SDP, FDP
		3rd (1980-82): SDP, FDP
Helmut Kohl (CDU)	1982-1998	1st (1982-83): CDU/CSU, FDP
		2nd (1983-87): CDU/CSU, FDP
		3rd (1987-90): CDU/CSU, FDP, DSU**
		4th (1990-94): CDU/CSU, FDP
		5th (1994-98): CDU/CSU, FDP
Gerhard Schroder (SDP)	1998-2005	1st (1998-2002): SDP, Greens
		2nd (2002-05): SDP, Greens
Angela Merkel (CDU)	2005-2021	1st (2005-09): CDU/CSU, SDP
		2nd (2009-13): CDU/CSU, FDP
		3rd (2013-17): CDU/CSU, SDP
		4th (2017-21): CDU/CSU, SDP
Olaf Scholz (SDP)	2021-2025	1st (2021-25): SDP, Greens, FDP
*The German Party (DP) was a small nationalist and pro-monarchist party that existed from 1949-61 **The German Social Party (DSU) was a small conservative party that existed briefly in the former East Germany in 1989-1990. It joined the Kohl 3rd Cabinet for a few months in 1990, then lost all of its seats in the next election.
Figure 5.1: Germany’s Cabinet coalitions: 1949-2025 (created by Mark L. Johnson)

Another possibility is a so-called “Grand Coalition”, where the leaders of the two major parties agree to share power, with only the smaller parties in opposition. Scholz himself came to national prominence as Finance Minister in Angela Merkel’s CDU-led third Cabinet (and Vice Chancellor in the fourth). Although Grand Coalitions have been very common in Austria (Germany’s southern neighbor), only four of the 24 postwar governments in Germany included membership from both major parties. The last CDU government prior to the rise of Willy Brandt as SDP leader (1966-69) was the first Grand Coalition. This arrangement wasn’t found again in Germany until the Chancellorship of Angela Merkel (2005-2021). Three of Merkel’s four Cabinets included SDP members.

5.2 – Federalism and the German Legislature

As the only directly elected body in Germany’s Federal system, the Bundestag is the chief policy-making authority. It adopts the national budget, must authorize all use of military force outside the borders of Germany, and verifies the adoption of treaties that have been negotiated by the government. This last power is quite important, given Germany’s status as a member of the European Union. As the EU has taken on more policy-making authority (particularly in areas like trade agreements, environmental protection, and energy policy), the Bundestag must decide how (or even if) to implement those directives at the domestic level. As has already been indicated, Chancellors and Cabinet Ministers hold their offices because of the support of the Bundestag. The partisan makeup of that body determines which parties have enough support to form governing coalitions.

Germany has a second legislative body, the Bundesrat (the Federal Council, or Council of States). As a Federal system, Germany’s sixteen States (also known as Land) retain quite a bit of sovereignty. Article 30 of the Basic Law grants broad authority to the Lander governments, and Articles 70 through 74 list many areas that belong to either the Land or Federal government exclusively, as well as those that are exercised concurrently (by both levels). Germany’s State governments guard that sovereignty through the Federal Council, the Bundesrat.

Unlike the much larger Bundestag, members of the Bundesrat are not elected by the public. Each State (Land) government, like the Federal system, has an elected legislature (a Landtag), with a Minister-President as head of government (similar to the Office of Governor in the US, and with powers similar to the Chancellor at the Federal level). Most State governments, like their Federal counterpart, have coalition ministries, so it’s common for multiple parties to be represented in the State governments. Those Minister-Presidents then appoint representatives, which reflect the coalition majority in their respective state. Each state appoints between three and six members of the Bundesrat, depending on population. Bundesrat members, unlike their counterparts in the larger chamber, do not have free reign to vote as they wish. They are expected to represent the positions of their appointing State governments; hence, each State delegation votes as a bloc.

Although the Bundesrat does not have the power to amend laws (and their ability to even propose new laws is somewhat limited by the Basic Law), they still serve as an important check on the other institutions of the Federal government. All bills proposed by the government go to the Bundesrat first, which must comment on it before it can be voted on in the Bundestag (although there are some time limits on this process, so the State Council can’t delay things indefinitely). More importantly, any bill that affects either the exclusive State powers, or any of the Concurrent powers (which the States will have to implement), must be approved by the Bundesrat before it can be sent to the President for final signature. Roughly half of all bills are subject to Bundesrat approval for final action. For treaties, and other laws that do not directly affect the powers of the State governments, the Bundesrat may attempt to veto those measures, but the Bundestag may (by majority vote), override that action.

State and Abbreviation	Population (2023 est)	Bundesrat Votes
Baden-Wurttemberg (BW)	11,339,260	6
Bavaria (BY)	13,435,062	6
Berlin (BE)	3,782,202	4
Brandenburg (BB)	2,581,667	4
Bremen (HB)	691,703	3
Hamburg (HH)	1,910,160	3
Hesse (HE)	6,420,729	5
Lower Saxony (NI)	8,161,981	6
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MV)	1,629,464	3
North Rhine-Westphalia (NW)	18,190,422	6
Rhineland-Palatinate (RP)	4,174,311	4
Saarland (SL)	944,424	3
Saxony (SN)	4,089,467	4
Saxony-Anhalt (ST)	2,180,448	4
Schleswig-Holstein (SH)	2,965,691	4
Thuringia (TH)	2,122,335	4
Figure 5.3 – Allocation of Seats in Bundesrat (created by Mark L. Johnson)

5.3 – Court System

Germany’s legal system operates on the Roman civil code system, where the courts are tasked with applying the written law to specific questions. This differs from the common law system found in many English-speaking countries, where courts apply precedents from previous cases, even if the facts of the case differ from previous ones. Actual trials, both civil and criminal, take place in localized courts which are administered at the State level. However, these courts apply both federal and state law, depending on the specific questions at hand. The lowest (and most numerous) level of courts (Local courts) have jurisdiction over lesser crimes and small civil disputes. The next group (Land courts) serves as both trial court (for more serious crimes and larger civil disputes), as well as the appellate authority for the Local courts. Regional courts (whose boundaries mostly conform to Land boundaries) serve as the Intermediate-level appellate courts, hearing appeals on whether the lower courts applied the law correctly. The Federal Court of Justice is the court of last report for all appeals on questions of civil and criminal law. The German system also has special jurisdiction courts for issues related to administrative law, patents, tax collections, and labor relations (each also has its own court of last resort, separate from the Federal Court of Justice). All judges in the German system are appointed by the State or Federal government (depending on which level they serve), through a civil service hiring procedure, run by either the Federal or State Ministry of Justice.

5.4 – Federal Constitutional Court

What none of the other courts have is authority over interpretation of the Basic Law. All questions of constitutional interpretation are decided by the Federal Constitutional Court. This Court can’t decide appeals on active cases in the regular court system, although it is common for lower courts to pause proceedings, and then ask the Constitutional Court for an interpretation on whether a statute (law) passes constitutional muster. The Court is also consulted quite frequently by the other institutions of the Federal system (President, Chancellor, both legislative chambers, or State governments) when there is disagreement over constitutional questions. We have already seen some examples in this chapter about how the Court has been utilized to interpret the meaning of the Basic Law.

The Court consists of sixteen Justices, appointed for twelve-year terms, with no allowance for reappointment. Half of the members are selected by the Bundestag, and half by the Bundesrat. A Justice must receive at least two-thirds of the vote in the appointing chamber in order to be seated. Most cases are heard in three-judge panels, with decisions requiring unanimous agreement by all three Justices. In the event that a panel issues a decision that seems to contradict a previous ruling, all sixteen Justices may meet in plenary session to resolve the question.

Section 6 – Political Economy

Long a major economy in Europe, Germany has experienced some recent struggles to maintain its position as a leading financial and industrial power.

6.1 – Labor Unions and Neo-corporatism

Although Germany is certainly a market-based economy, its approach to industrial and labor relations is different from that found in other capitalist societies. The right to form and join labor unions is enshrined in Article 9 of the Basic Law. Since 1949, unions in Germany have generally enjoyed the right to engage in “sectoral bargaining”. This means that the union that represents workers in a particular industry (for example, in steelmaking) has the right to negotiate contracts with every large employer (in this case, all of the steel mills) within an entire region of country. Smaller employers are covered under localized negotiated contracts. Non-unionized employers can hire workers outside of negotiated contract terms, but are not protected from strikes (as a trade-off for agreeing to sectoral contracts, major employers are insured against their labor forces going on strike). A 1976 law (passed by the Helmut Schmidt-led SDP government) required labor union representative on corporate boards (in firms with more than 2,000 employees), and provided for “work councils” (in most companies, even smaller ones), which manage day-to-day operations of the company (Jager, Noy, and Schofer 2022). This arrangement has led some scholars to refer to the Germany economic model as “neo-corporatist”. Traditional corporatism, as practiced in countries such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal during the 1930s and 1940s, saw those governments grant sole recognition not just to particular labor unions, but also to youth organizations, religious clubs, and other institutions claiming to represent certain sectors of civil society. Neo-corporatist models still allow for competition in most sectors of society, and, as indicated above, German employers still have the option to operate outside of sectoral bargaining (as long as they’re willing to accept the risks of strikes and other organized labor action).

6.2 – The Shrinking German Economy

Germany is the only country among the G7 (the group of seven highly industrialized Western economies) to experiencing a drop in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2023, and estimates project that its 2024 GDP will also show a loss (Fletcher, Kemp, and Sher 2024). Energy costs due to the Russia-Ukraine war have soared. Much of Germany’s energy infrastructure (pipelines and transfer facilities) are dependent on supplies from the east, and switching to western LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) would be much more expensive. The 2011 decision to shutter all nuclear plants, and convert to renewables, has continuously been hampered by a lack of development for wind and solar projects (Lontay 2024). German’s major manufacturers have also struggled to balance consumer demand and the requirements of the EU’s rather aggressive environmental policies. Volkswagen (VW), a major symbol of German industrial might, has estimated that it will have to lay off 300,000 workers, and close three plants, as a result of lessened demand for electric-powered vehicles. However, given the legal status of VW’s unions, such an action might not be possible (Schmidt, Steitz, and Amann 2024).

6.3 – Lagging Economic Indicators in the East

Although East and West Germany were unified in 1990, the economic conditions in the two countries were starkly different. East Germany, being a command economy on the Soviet model, was dominated by state-owned firms that produced goods not because there was market demand for those products, but because the government deemed them essential. West Germany, on the other hand, was already a major industrial and financial power, integrated into not only the European common market, but as a key trade partner with other large industrial economies in North America and Asia.

In 1991, as was indicated earlier, the Kohl (CDU) government introduced a “solidarity tax”, which was intended to fund economic development projects in the States of the former East Germany, in an attempt to equalize the two economies. In 2019, the Merkel government reduced the tax for all but the richest Germans. A current case pending in the Federal Constitutional Court may lead to the end of this arrangement, although the Court will likely not rule until later in 2025 (DW 2019; Reuters 2024).

Although the Federal governments efforts have led to equalizing of economic conditions across the country, the eastern States still lag their Western counterparts. A German Institute for Economic Research study in 2017 showed that the average worker in the western states earned about 3,000 Euros a month, compared to 2,300 in the east. Twice as many eastern workers were earning the minimum wage, according to the same study, and the average family net worth in the west was about 2.5 times higher than in the east (Kaufmann 2020). As indicated Section 5, both Die Linke (The Left) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) score higher percentages of the vote in the eastern part of the country, partially by tapping into these economic frustrations.

Section 7 – Foreign Affairs and International Politics

When the United Nations was created at the end of World War Two, the five key Allies (the US, UK, Soviet Union, China, and France) assumed the most influence in the new organization, especially with their status as Permanent Members of the Security (and the veto that went along with that status). With the Federal Republic an ally of the three western powers, while the Democratic Republic was part of the Soviet sphere, neither Germany was admitted to the UN until 1973. However, the Federal Republic (West Germany) did join the NATO alliance in 1955, and participated in the various European Community organs (that culminated in the founding of the European Union in 1993).

7.1 – Germany and the United Nations

Since their joint admissions in 1973, both Germanies served as non-permanent members on the Security (West Germany in 1977-78 and 1987-88; and East Germany during the 1980-1981 term). Since reunification, the nation has sat on the Council four times (the last in 2019-2020), and is a candidate for the 2027-28 term (Troller 2019; Germany in the United Nations 2024).

Germany is the fourth-largest contributor to the United Nations budget (approximately 6% of the total). Currently, German troops are participating in peace-keeping missions in Lebanon, Kosovo, and South Sudan (Germany in the United Nations 2024). Germany, along with Japan, Brazil, and India, has long supported a proposed reform to the Security Council, which would give those four countries (plus two in Africa) permanent seats (including the veto). However, competing proposals from several countries in the developing world (as well as resistance from some current Permanent Members to the entire concept of expansion) have left those debates in limbo (Hasselbach 2023; Thibault 2020).

7.2. The NATO alliance and the European Union

As has been mentioned before in multiple places, West Germany joined the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance in 1955, and welcomed an American military presence on its territory ever since (with the expanded nuclear weapon presence in 1979 already discussed in Section 3). In the same time period, West Germany was one of the original members of the European Economic Community (founded in 1957), the forerunner of today’s European Union. From the perspectives of West Germany’s allies (especially France, the UK, the US), the reasons for this alliance are multi-faceted. Recall that Germany, less than two decades earlier, had unleased the horrors of war on the rest of the world. By integrating at least part of Germany in the Western economic system and a defensive alliance, it was hoped that this relationship would tie the fortunes of West Germany to its western neighbors, thus averting the chances of future conflict. As one of the conditions of joining NATO, the Adenauer government vowed to never pursue its own nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However, this prohibition didn’t apply to those types of weapons from being placed on German soil (since they were owned and controlled by the Americans or the British).

This economic integration, as has already been discussed in previous sections, created one of Europe’s most vibrant economics. Despite its current challenges, Germany’s overall GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is still third highest in the world (and the highest in Europe), and in the Top Twenty on a per capita (per person) basis. Germany, along with its Nordic neighbors (particularly Holland and Denmark) is one of the chief funders of the European Union, and has been the lead in setting EU policy in several areas (such as the debt relief and Middle East migration examples mentioned earlier).

However, the current geopolitical situation brought about by the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created challenges for the German government. German memories of Soviet occupation and an even longer tradition of Russian-German rivalry for primacy in Central Europe would suggest that Germans would be sympathetic to the Ukrainian side. However, Germany has long been dependent on Russian gas supplies for its energy needs. Germany also has allowed its defense spending to lag behind that of most of its other NATO allies. Even though all NATO countries agreed to spend at least 2% of their GDPs on defense in 2014, Germany has only recently begun to raise its defense budget to anything near that mark (the most recent proposal, for 2025, would bring Germany up to 1.9%). Another complication is that France, the other leading funder in the EU (now that the United Kingdom has left the organization after Brexit) would like to shift European security policy away from being led by the NATO (which many Europeans fear is too US-centric), towards making the European Union both a financial AND military alliance (Dempsey 2022; Ash 2024; Cameron 2024).

As a key economic power, and due to its geopolitical importance in Northern and Central Europe, Germany is sure to play a key role in international affairs for years to come.

 

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